Preamble 71 to 83.
(71) The obligation to prioritise the production of certain products respects the essence of and does not disproportionately affect the freedom to conduct a business and the freedom of contract laid down in Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’) and the right to property laid down in Article 17 of the Charter. Any limitation of those rights in this Regulation will, in accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter, be provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights and freedoms, and comply with the principle of proportionality.
(72) When the crisis stage is activated, two or more Member States could mandate the Commission to aggregate demand and act on their behalf for their public procurement in the public interest, in accordance with existing Union rules and procedures, leveraging its purchasing power. Common purchasing should be used only to address supply-chain disruptions of semiconductors during a crisis. The mandate could authorise the Commission to enter into agreements concerning the purchase of crisis-relevant products for certain critical sectors.
The Commission should assess for each request the utility, necessity and proportionality in consultation with the European Semiconductor Board. Where it intends to not follow the request, it should inform the Member States concerned and the European Semiconductor Board and give its reasons. The procedural details should be set out in an agreement between the Commission and the participating Member States, including reasons for the use of the common purchasing mechanism and liabilities to be assumed. Such an agreement may include the number of contracts to be concluded and the conditions of the common purchasing, such as prices, delivery timeframes, quantities and opt-in or opt-out clauses.
The common purchasing may result in the signature of one contract covering the needs of all Member States or several contracts each covering the needs of one or more Member States. Furthermore, the participating Member States should be entitled to appoint representatives to provide guidance and advice during the procurement procedures and in the negotiation of the purchasing agreements. The deployment, use or resale of purchased products should remain within the remit of the participating Member States.
(73) During a semiconductor shortage crisis, it might become necessary that the Union considers protective measures. The European Semiconductor Board should be able to express its views to inform the Commission’s assessment of whether the market situation amounts to a significant shortage of essential products pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2015/479.
(74) The institutional framework for expert groups, including the rules on transparency for the entity and its sub-groups, should apply to the European Semiconductor Board, without prejudice to this Regulation. The European Semiconductor Board should provide advice to and assist the Commission on specific questions.
Those questions should include providing advice on the Initiative to the Public Authorities Board of the Chips Joint Undertaking; exchanging information on the functioning of integrated production facilities and open EU foundries; discussing and preparing the identification of specific sectors and technologies with potential high social impact and security significance in need of certification for trusted products and addressing coordinated monitoring and crisis response.
Furthermore, the European Semiconductor Board should ensure the consistent application of this Regulation, facilitate cooperation between Member States as well as exchange of information on issues relating to this Regulation. The European Semiconductor Board should also exchange views with the Commission on the best ways to ensure effective protection and enforcement of IP rights, confidential information and trade secrets with due involvement of stakeholders in relation to the semiconductor sector.
The European Semiconductor Board should support the Commission in international cooperation in line with international obligations. It should serve as a forum for discussion on, inter alia, how to enhance cooperation along the global semiconductor value chain without prejudice to the prerogatives of the European Parliament and of the Council in accordance with the Treaties.
For this purpose, the European Semiconductor Board should take into account the views of the Industrial Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor Technologies and of other stakeholders. In addition, the European Semiconductor Board should coordinate, cooperate and exchange information with other Union crisis response and crisis preparedness structures with a view to ensuring a coherent and coordinated Union approach as regards crisis response and crisis preparedness measures for semiconductor crises.
(75) A representative of the Commission should chair the European Semiconductor Board. Each Member State should appoint at least one high-level representative to the European Semiconductor Board. They could also appoint different representatives in relation to different tasks of the European Semiconductor Board, for example, depending on which part of this Regulation is discussed in the meetings of the European Semiconductor Board.
To receive important advice on the activities of the European Semiconductor Board and allow appropriate participation of stakeholders, the Chair should be able to establish sub-groups and should be entitled to establish working arrangements by inviting experts and observers to take part in the meetings on an ad hoc basis or to invite stakeholders, in particular organisations representing the interests of the Union semiconductors industry, such as the Industrial Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor Technologies, to its sub-groups as observers.
(76) The European Semiconductor Board should hold separate meetings for its tasks in relation to the Initiative and for its tasks in relation to security of supply and resilience as well as monitoring and crisis response. Member States should endeavour to ensure effective and efficient cooperation in the European Semiconductor Board.
The Chair should be able to facilitate exchanges between the European Semiconductor Board and other Union bodies, offices, agencies and expert and advisory groups. In light of the importance of the supply of semiconductors for other sectors and the resulting need for coordination, the Chair should ensure participation by other Union institutions and bodies as observers in meetings of the European Semiconductor Board where relevant and appropriate in relation to the monitoring and crisis response mechanism established in this Regulation.
In order to continue and make use of the work following the implementation of Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/210 (25), the European Semiconductor Board should carry out the tasks of the European Semiconductor Expert Group. Once the European Semiconductor Board is operational, this expert group should cease to exist.
(77) Member States hold a key role in the application and enforcement of this Regulation. In this respect, each Member State should designate one or more national competent authorities responsible for the effective implementation of this Regulation and ensure that those authorities are adequately empowered and resourced.
Member States could designate an existing authority or authorities. In order to increase organisation efficiency in the Member States and to set an official point of contact vis-a-vis the public and other counterparts at Union and Member State level, including the Commission and the European Semiconductor Board, each Member State should designate, within one of the authorities it designates as competent authority under this Regulation, one national single point of contact responsible for coordinating issues related to this Regulation and cross-border cooperation with competent authorities of other Member States.
(78) In order to ensure trustful and constructive cooperation of competent authorities at Union and national level, all parties involved in the application of this Regulation should respect the confidentiality of information and data obtained in carrying out their tasks to protect in particular IP rights, sensitive business information and trade secrets.
Any information acquired in the application for recognition as an integrated production facility or open EU foundry, in the context of information requests or notification obligations under this Regulation, should be used only for the purposes of this Regulation and should be covered by the obligation of professional secrecy in accordance with Article 339 TFEU, as well as internal Commission rules on the secure handling of data, in particular Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/443.
The Commission and the national competent authorities, their officials, servants and other persons working under the supervision of these authorities as well as officials and civil servants of other authorities of the Member States should ensure the confidentiality of information obtained in carrying out their tasks and activities. This should also apply to the European Semiconductor Board and the Semiconductor Committee established by this Regulation. Where appropriate, the Commission should be able to adopt implementing acts to specify the practical arrangements for the treatment of confidential information in the context of information gathering.
(79) Compliance with the obligations imposed under this Regulation should be enforceable by means of fines and periodic penalty payments. To that end, appropriate levels of fines for non-compliance with information requests and notification obligations under this Regulation should be laid down, taking into account the different levels of gravity of the non-compliance between both obligations and with different ceilings for SMEs.
Furthermore, periodic penalty payments should be laid down for non-compliance with the obligation to accept and perform priority-rated orders, which should be proportionate and reflect the price levels on the market during the last 90 days, with different ceilings for SMEs. Limitation periods should apply for the impositions of fines and periodic penalty payments, in addition to limitation periods for the enforcement of penalties. In addition, the Commission should give the concerned undertaking or representative organisations of undertakings the right to be heard.
(80) In order to reflect technological change and market developments, to ensure effective implementation and evaluation of the Initiative and to lay down detailed rules for the label of design centres of excellence, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission with a view to amending this Regulation with regard to the actions supported by the Initiative in a manner consistent with its objectives and with regard to the measurable indicators for monitoring the implementation of the Initiative and for reporting on its progress towards the achievement of its objectives, and with a view to supplementing this Regulation by establishing the procedure for applications and the requirements and conditions for the granting, monitoring and withdrawal of the label of design centres of excellence.
It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (27). In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.
(81) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission as regards the selection of ECICs, so that the objectives of the Initiative are achieved, laying down the practical and operational arrangements for the functioning of priority-rated orders, and specifying the practical arrangements for the treatment of confidential information. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
(82) Since the objective of this Regulation, namely to establish a framework for strengthening the semiconductor ecosystem at Union level, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.
(83) In order to allow for the implementation of this Regulation to start as soon as possible, with a view to reaching its objectives, it should enter into force as a matter of urgency.